It has been traditional in medicine to note symptoms and elicit signs and to group these into a reliable clinical pattern and thus define a syndrome and thereafter to search for a pathology which might explain the postulated disease. In this process, naming plays a significant part. Names are given to the symptoms, the syndrome is given an especially distinct name while the pathological processes are usually given several names. The best names are often long and impressive. This naming often gives ease and sometimes major satisfaction to doctor, patient and relatives. The names, of course, have a reality value. They enshrine observations and concepts and help us to think and build up our knowledge of the world about us, and thus help us towards mastery of it.
In the pursuit of logical ordering this naming also contains something of incantation magic. Sometimes, the names we give to certain elements of disease hide ignorance rather than reveal knowledge, but nevertheless they can still give some satisfaction. Every doctor knows the relief he can bring to a patient once he gives the distress a namesuch as gastritis or cephalagia, or anxiety neurosis, even if the name does not mean very much in terms of certainty or clear pathology. The young mother distraught with fearful fantasies over her child who is ill and hot becomes calm and practical once the Can. Psychiatr. Assoc. J. Vol. 22 (1977) doctor gives the condition a name -say "measles". She now knows a contained reality instead of a limitless fantasy. Even the tragic mother whose child is more or less incurably mad is astonishingly eased by the doctor naming the madness as Autism.
Naming brings the comfort of orderreal or imagined -out of chaos. The helplessness of ignorance with its associated and uncontrollable fears is replaced by some degree of ego-mastery once the name is given. The anxiety of this helplessness is one of the major driving factors towards the development of ego-skills; and the need to replace helplessness by mastery animates all scientific endeavour. Thus, the search for knowledge has the primary aim of defence against anxiety as well as secondary constructive aims. The need for this defence against helplessness may, however, lead not only to valuable naming and to valuable knowledge, but to the anxious embrace of knowledge and names which may be comforting but have little explanatory value. In psychiatry, a subject in which human anxiety and panic can be at its highest, it is not always easy to be sure when our names and knowledge are sophisticated and constructive and when their major function is only magically defensive. That is one good reason for our coming together regularly to keep an eye on each other, to share findings and to give and take criticism.
Kraepelin's observing and classifying signs and symptoms followed carefully the medico-biological tradition. He offered a new imaginative synthesis which gave order to a relatively chaotic field, and produced his nosology of Dementia Praecox, with all its impressive names. His work, and subsequently that of Bleuler, with schizophrenia -another fine name -has stood the test of time to fashion a descriptive psychiatry which now has its own conceptual language. We can therefore give confident names to the symptoms and signs we may observe or evoke in patients. Terms such as "thought disorder", "incongruity of affect" and "appersonation" give us the comfort of being able to order, intellectually, the various phenomena and help us to make confident final diagnoses.
This capacity to name a diagnosis is especially satisfying for both doctor and patient in the case of bodily disorders, although less so for mental disorders. In bodily disorder the complainer can know that his body is understood by another, no matter what the prognosis, and that the doctor is the skilled companion of his distress about his body. But when the disorder is not about the patient's possession -his body -but about the essence of the patient -himself -it is different. The naming of the disorder by the doctor does not now help the patient to feel that his doctor understands him; rather that he himself as a person is labelled and somehow dismissed, perhaps even that his thoughts and feelings are not understood but merely classified. Indeed the name may make the patient feel not merely misunderstood but even abused. This is because descriptive psychiatry concerns only externals, the external expressions of mind and behaviour, and therefore rarely helps us to understand and be a companion to the patient's inner experience of himself, and what it is like to be him on the inside. This science of externals -descriptive psychiatry -provides much help for the observer in his efforts at mental mastery but little for the subject of observation. The satisfactions it brings to both patient and doctor are therefore liable to be less than total. The following clinical event may take this point further.
A young schizophrenic woman, a wife and mother, was leaving me after a single consultation. This had contained the sharing of painful matters and several periods of sane discussion, but now she stopped at the door and held out her hand with a sweet smile. She shook mine solicitously and said with sympathetic concern, "Good-bye. I do hope things will get better for you and that your dear children will not be too upset. "
Following the medical tradition we can agree that the thought was inappropriate and the affect incongruous, and also that it would be proper to regard this as an instance of appersonation, insofar as she had taken on the characteristics of a doctor rather than of a patient. These data could confirm the diagnosis and give some intellectual satisfaction to an objective doctor interested in schizophrenia. In addition, for a noninvolved psychoanalyst it could have other points of interest. Was it an instance of primary identification, the result of a regression from object-cathexis because of impending loss of the object, in this case myself? Was it a sign of loss of ego-boundaries and a merging which could obviate the parting at the door? Was it an instance of projective and introjective identification whereby the sick parts of the patient were split off from her ego and projected into me, while the doctor aspects of me were internalized by her?
Such psychiatric and psychoanalytic attempts to name and classify and understand the phenomena "out there" were more or less within my capacities, but I was not content simply to understand in this way, because something more vital was going on. This vital matter is something that will be familiar to all who work in psychiatry, yet it is a feature of our work rarely studied or discussed. It is simply that a doctor is not an uninvolved scientist but also a human being beset by feelings and wishes, by subjectivity. This woman and I had been involved in a working relationship and insofar as she had areas of intact ego we had, for some of the time, related honestly to each other. But now, at the door and in a flash, she was mad again, and I, off guard, was suddenly and inescapably enmeshed in a mad relationship, not merely as a classifying scientist but as a person. During the consultation we had faced some awkward facts together including the need for hospitalization and we knew it was painful for her that I should not see her again, but here she was now, this fellow human, madly smiling and treating me sweetly, as a kind doctor might treat a distressed patient. It was, to put it mildly, disconcerting. So far as 1 can recollect several things crossed my mind. For a fraction of a second 1 was stunned, disorientated, unsure of who 1 was, even a bit mad. 1 thought about my children, realized they were all grown up and not upset, so struggling in a rapid reality-test 1 re-found myself and reaffirmed for myself that 1 was not in distress but was a doctor and that she was this patient. All this in a fraction of a second. And now 1 was concerned for her plight. "Good-bye. 1 do hope things will get better for you and that your dear children will not be too upset." There was little time to think. How to respond meaningfully and at once? 1 could let her mad good wishes fall upon defensively tolerant deaf ears, and ignore her remarks as if in bad form, simply nod and say good-bye. This would get me out of the mad relationship, indeed any relationship with her; but it would leave her alone with her madness, unrecognized and unchecked by her or me. Or 1 could collude with her madness and say something like, "Thank you for your good wishes." This would avoid contention or strain for both of us, but this evasive defence would merely confirm her mad beliefs. It would mean that her world had also become a bit crazy in its response and certainly dishonest, not to be relied on as an auxiliary ego. 1 could have defended myself by treating her not as a fellow adult but as a child and could have given her friendly admonishment on the error of her perceptions, gentle reproof for being mad, unlike me. Of course 1 wanted to do better than that but 1had only that second for reflection. Remembering that there was a sane part of her, 1 tried to address it and found myself saying something like, "I think you don't like having to leave and want to take me with you and to remember me and not to be a patient but be me as a doctor. And it seems that you want to leave your mental upset here with me. So you want to be the doctor who gives out best wishes about it and about your children. " She looked serious for a long second or two and then left slowly.
1 was not pleased with my remarks and remained uneasy for a time. True 1 had made some attempt to sort out our positions as well as to acknowledge her distress at leaving but 1 was disturbed by the desperation of her attempt to cope with the parting. 1 had recovered myself as a doctor who could distance himself from and recognize and name certain phenomena, but 1 could not achieve that distance from her desperation and 1 remained unhappily occupied by it. 1 could not ignore this fact, so 1began to think about it. On reflection it seemed possible to me that she had tried to expel not only patienthood and worried motherhood from her life and into mine but also this very desperation which 1 now felt on her behalf and which pained me inside. Her identification with my doctoring seemed to be her attempt not to lose me; but 1 also felt, rightly or wrongly, that it contained a protest at me for allowing what for her was an unbearable event -a parting from a source of help.
1 did not see the patient again and have no proof nor disproof of my views, which derive of course from the working hypotheses of Freud about object-loss and of Melanie Klein about ego-splitting and projective and introjective processes. 1 also acknowledge that there are other ways of viewing her parting behaviour, but intellectual discussion about her behaviour on parting would take us away from my purpose in offering this vignette. This was, you remember, to illustrate that the objectivity of the uninvolved scientist who observes and names and classifies human pain is not fully satisfying and that in any event the doctor who aims at close encounter with madness cannot remain external and uninvolved. The choices open to him are few. He can only be involved and think about his involvement and the strains of this, or he can defend himself against these, by various mental manoeuvres, splitting off and dismissing his feelings, using manic denial and amusement, contempt, and so forth. These defences are of course simply other forms of involvement and not very useful for his doctoring abilities, but we need not be censorious about them. Very few workers can sustain serious attempts to make close contact with someone who can be variously sane and then very mad. To be personally enmeshed in mad relations creates more than intellectual problems. It may threaten one's own sense of self, one's sincerity, good will and integrity and may disturb for some time after one's own peace of mind and, as my example shows, it is not easy thereafter to disencumber oneself from such complex strains.
Multiply by fifty the working strain of the few seconds of close encounter with madness I have illustrated and one arrives at some estimate of what it is like to relate closely, regularly and devotedly to mad people in an effort to understand them. Serious therapeutic encounter requires that one allow oneself to be regularly enmeshed in the mad relation and to be filled up with crazy thoughts, desperations, rages, anxieties and alien identities and yet, without defending oneself against these, also to regain frequently a reliable capacity to think imaginatively and compassionately about complex processes in the other; to sort out first the mad thoughts and distresses forced into oneself, and then the madnesses of the patient.
The strains of thus trying to understand the internal experience of mad people are immense, and all psychoanalysts of mad people know these strains. Searles, to choose one author among several has well described the plight of the therapist and the effort needed during and after treatment sessions to extricate oneself from alien mad feelings, confusions, despairs, rages, guilts, and so on, to regain sureness about one's own intra-psychic world and the capacity to feel and think authentically. We need not then be surprised and we cannot be critical if the majority of those whose working life is with mad people seek ways of alleviating these strains of close encounter; by distancing themselves from patients in various waysmental, social and geographic -and by adopting various mental defences against their own capacities to feel deeply about overwhelming distresses in another. And we need not be surprised if some of these defences are enshrined as medical and nursing procedures.
Kraepelin, that great man, used one way the now common and scientifically respectable retreat into descriptive psychiatry. He assiduously studied details of his patients' external responses. He Was humane in a general way but determinedly remained an uninvolved observer. For him patients were objects of observation and nos ubjects of encounter. He avoided enmeshment in madness and described it beautifully from the outside, from the observer's point of view, but made no attempt to understand it as an experience of the patient. His studies of the external signs and patterns of madness were marvellously creative for a diagnostic scheme, although not for what it is like to be mad. This approach to madness has clearly appealed to many distinguished workers, and descriptive psychiatry is unquestionably scientific at a certain level of fact. But if we can recognize its scope we should also recognize its limitations. It allows cool and informed part-encounter with patients simply because it contains this scientific objectifying "disease-ifying" defence against close encounter with people. All successful defence against pain means a loss of some capacity to experience something of the self and of the other, but we also know that -as in the case of Kraepelin -adaptive and creative growth is possible by skilled elaboration of the defensive process itself. Loss and gain. Descriptive psychiatry has provided relief from folklore and prejudice because it offers naming and some degree of mastery over otherwise frightening or horrifying phenomena. It alone has saved many a madman from wild subjective responses; violence, abuse, humiliation, incarceration, moral isms , disownment, and so on. Nonetheless, because of the defensive elements in this objectivization of human experience, descriptive psychiatry traditionally enshrines certain blindnesses. R. D. Laing has pointed out that the responses of a patient which Kraepelin faithfully recorded and valued as examples of the madman's bizarre response to questions could be looked at in another way; not as responses to the questions, but to the questioner, his motives and attitudes. Regarded thus they can be understood fairly clearly; and can be seen to contain indignant but despairing comments about Kraepelin' s "objective" behaviour and his non-involved insensitive questioning. It must be remembered that in Kraepelin's time the doctorpatient relationship, and the decisive contribution of the doctor to what emerges from the patient at the interview had not received deliberate study in either its conscious or unconscious aspects and that Kraepelin was not interested in it. He was thus blind not only to the significance for the patient of his own so-called objective uninvolved behaviour and not only to his insensitivity in using his patient to educate an audience, but also how the patient responded to that. His interest was not in the patient but in categorizing the responses of the patient as examples of the flaws in mad people; he therefore suppressed his own subjectivity and ignored that of the patient. This dismissal of subjectivity led to poverty of observation about those other more painful matters to which Laing has drawn attention -the patient's distorted identification with the doctor (as with my own patient) and the oblique statements of anger and pain about his regard for the patient, not as a fellow human being but as a static object.
Objectivity -the regard for people as mere objects -is one hall-mark of the scientist. Scientific method is of course historically rooted in the study of inanimate matter, things, not the study ofliving people. In the endeavour to use the not-to-bequestioned sciences of inanimate matter for our work with people, their essential method of fragmenting the field of study into static controllable elements leads us to ignore, or somehow pervert, the truths of whole living creatures. Thus we can reify them, and refashion the data about them as dead manipulable bits, things which can be thought about rather than felt about: measurements, numbers, parts of behaviour, examples of disease, elements in a cohort, cases, chromosomal examples, members of a series, examples of biochemistry, and so on. The study of the unique living person tends to get lost in this methodology because science has no means of encompassing a whole living person. (' 'The trouble about measuring people is that they do not stay still.") To put it more simply it is not possible to get to know or understand another person except by the full employment of one's subjectivity as well as one's objectivity. Objectivity alone is a means of observing but not of getting to know the other. It has its essential uses of course, but also woeful limitations, and yes, is ultimately misleading in clinical studies of people because it does not further at all our understanding of the inner life of man. Nonetheless, all of us regularly use objectification today to collect non-living data about our patients. I repeat, it has its uses which although limited are not negligible; but I hope it will already be clear that we also use it as did Kraepe1in, perhaps primarily, to amass names and knowledge as a defence against understanding, and to ensure that we do not observe more than we can subjectively tolerate. Many of us could not carry on in psychiatry if we did not use the same objectifying stance as did Kraepelin to avoid awareness of such matters as confusion, despair or other pains, either in ourselves or in our patients. At awkward moments which he cannot handle, many is the psychiatrist who stops listening for communications of feelings and starts questioning about details, talking or taking action, who stops trying to understand and instead begins to collect information, imposing a scheme of behaviour fashioned in his mind long before he met this unique patient, safe now in traditional routines. History taking for example can be an excellent way out of present strains and family history is a safe, even hallowed, escape route from experiencing painful deep relations with patients. We cling gratefully to this tradition because it respectably enshrines our defences. I must emphasize that of course histories have their own place in the study of patients; my comment is rather about the way they can be and most often are timed and used defensively, to avoid encounter with present pain. Similarly, our resort to a busy search for extemals, signs and symptoms, may often be essential as a psychiatric "character-defence" in the face of madnesses we cannot understand, and the pains of which we dare not share. It was the same with that humane man Kraepelin. In this avoidance of relations it must be emphasized that one patient's madness is strain enough, perhaps too much; and, if we have many patients, who shall blame us when we erect respectable routines to keep us distant from excessive strain? And if we embrace descriptive psychiatry?
The safe naming of externals helps us avoid feeling lost in chaos and helps us put distance between ourselves and the madness we might encounter and be enmeshed in. Thus our leamed language and our logic preserve us from too much encounter with illogical matters. Winnicott once said that the first duty of a doctor to his patients is to survive, and in this survival within psychiatry, defences are essential. But we need not pretend that the procedures which spring from this defensive need -our fragmentation of people into phenomena which can be reified and our resultant methods of examining and treating these dehumanized phenomena -are simply altruistic skilled techniques of examination, diagnosis and care, born only out of sophistication about people and pain. The most we can ask of ourselves is that in recognizing the survival value of traditional descriptive psychiatry, the fragmentation of the patient into his parts, his organs and chemistry, and heredity, and signs and symptoms, and our study and describing and naming these and categorizing the external behaviour, we also remain discontent with it as a scientific technique for understanding and helping the experience of madness on the inside. Following such discontent it can always be a matter for honest discussion, by us, how far some resultant psychiatric treatments benefit patients and how far they benefit rather us, our staffs and the relatives; and we need not be ashamed if sometimes we conclude that they are essentially to protect these latter from unbearably close contact with the distressing madness of the patients we care for. If there is determination to be honest and not to fool ourselves, we may aim to measure honestly all benefits when deciding on and assessing the effects of psychiatry, and to be clear and unapologetic about whom the various benefits are for.
Laing's critical attitude towards all who fail to respect and listen to and hear and relate to the plight of madmen, and his anger that classifying psychiatrists fail to study the effects of their defensively objective behaviour towards patients, clearly springs from a deep compassion for sick people. He is properly indignant that the resigned despair at ever being understood, which he sees behind the withdrawal of patients, is so often ignored or is regarded as a disease symptom rather than a move in a painful relationship. He is clear about the mystification induced in patients by the defences of others against close encounter, such as evasiveness, insincerity, aloofness, collusion, distancing, inconsistent compassion, patronizing reassurance, and so on. He, like Stanton and Schwartz before him, is also emphatic about the ill-effects on patients of the failures of others to provide a sincere adapting environment which is open and honest about its tensions. He disagrees with much of psychopharmacological practice because it is directed towards suppressing the patients' reactions to us rather than towards understanding them. But it seems to me he fails to understand that behind each objective descriptive classifying psychiatrist there is a human being variously concerned and in danger of being tom, enraged, frustrated, desolated by the madness before him, sometimes to such an extent that he dare not experience the pain or the despairs either in the patient or in himself; and that massive feelings or massive insensitivity are at times inevitable responses to intolerably disturbing patients.
The working distresses of psychiatrists are rarely fully conscious or owned openly, and (almost) never discussed as facts which merit scientific study. Rather they are suppressed, even repressed, as something we must rise above, something professionally shameful; subjectivity as a primary fact is rarely studied or valued because it is a menace to the idealized defence of objectivity. The doctor's strains are not however abolished by silence, merely hidden, and like the return of the repressed in neurosis they return in disguised forms, like pirates, sailing under flags of false objectivity and spurious science. A desperate Furor Therapeuticus is one possible result, often well rationalized although driven by inner distress. Another is to turn away from patients to administration, research, or academic teaching. The inability to live with feelings of uselessness or despair drives some practitioners to erect various omnipotent beliefs in the efficacy of this or that new treatment, or procedure, or regime. Some of these have defensive values so personally dear to various psychiatrists that I would be reluctant to mention any except for the certainty that they will be defended with passionate rationalization, in any event. None by itself need be cruel or thoughtless but whenever pursued with passion we can be sure that they are needed much for the psychiatrist's peace of mind. Narcosis, ECT, planned regression, behaviour therapy, industrial rehabilitation, pharmacology, early discharge from hospital, milieu therapy, crisis therapy, family therapy, can all be used in this way, not modestly and sceptically but passionately. There is nothing new in this. The subjective problems of those who were threatened in the past by close encounter with madness has given us a psychiatric literature littered with the corpses of yesterday's theories and therapeutic hopes and we can be sure that tomorrow's workers will have the same problems as yesterday's and today's.
Laing, in fine contempt for the inappropriateness, even, as he sees it, the cruelty of some treatments of today seems to me to ignore the desperate need for defences against pain which has animated them. The plight of the madman has led Laing to great indignation at all failures of their human environment. It is clear however that his compassion does not extend to those in the environment who have to bear the awful pain of unending close encounter with madness and who are in no position to dismiss it as a disease with an impressive name. In his championship of the madman and his pains in an insensitive and ill-responding family he ignores the destructiveness of the madman both towards himself and others in the family. He is therefore less than scientific about the plight of the madman's family and the threats to their mental balance unless they avoid close encounter and adopt defensive stratagems against it. That these stratagems may include insensitivities, distancing, objectification, evasions, mystifying duplicities and insincerities, angers, contempts, misinterpretations and self-justifications, cannot be denied. Such responses are easily observable also in ourselves and in our staffs. They are almost never helpful and may be severely damaging to the patient but they appear to be inevitable in the much-needed defences against deep enmeshment with madness of the kind mentioned in my short clinical example. Among the pains and fears which animate these defensive reactions we should include anger and sadness and hurt that such love and resource and effort as exists in families and staffs has proved useless.
The defensive behaviour of families against the pains of deep encounter with patients is as much the product of the patient as, if we are to follow Laing and his co-workers, the patient's madness is the product of the family. Of course the family is often insincere with the patient and of course splits and denials and hidden quarrels occur in the members around the madman, and increase his mystification and isolation and confusion. Stanton and Schwartz have shown how resolution of such tensions among hospital staffs can lead to dramatic clinical improvement (but not cure) for all concerned, and family therapists can endorse this for the home. But Laing goes further than this. He regards the families' attitudes not merely as reactive but causative of the patient's withdrawal from mature objectrelations. He even suggests that the patient's retreat into madness is the only sane and logical step he can take in such situations. He thus denies the patient's own essential madness. The patient's contributions to the family situation are, for Laing, not essentially mad, merely self-preservative responses to family inadequacy. That the relatives' defensiveness is the only step they can take in such situations is a possibility which Laing ignores. His indignant compassion is for the one, not for the many.
Laing's is a rare voice which spoke up for patients at a time when there were few to do so. We psychiatrists could better accept his scorn of treatments and regimes which ignore them as people if only he would understand our own plight. His inability to contemplate the essential madness of the madman and the suffering and mad-relations into which they force others seems to me to spring, however, from his own particular defence against the painful fact of madness. In insisting indignantly that mad people are not mad but rather suffering from others, he fails to face the real tragedy -that they suffer from themselves and have a psychic life under remorseless attack from forces within. Moreover his viewpoint offers no room for the scientific study of the suffering of others whose lives are invaded by the madness forced on them by the patient. It therefore contains no hope of careful studies of the bizarre object-relations which madmen make; without which there can be, in my opinion, no fundamental psychology of madness.
Thomas Szasz, like Laing, a compassionately indignant champion of the madman, protests especially at the way descriptive psychiatry is used to objectify and classify madness into disease and to regard madmen as instances of that rather than as subjects of suffering. He rages at the way naming disenfranchises them first of human status and then of legal freedoms. It is of course true that descriptive psychiatrists employ objectification as a defence against painful involvement in madness and that this need for intellectual distance from pain can lead in spite of general humane wishes to the dehumanization into cases (e.g. "a schizophrenic"), which Szasz deplores. This defensive concentration on the science of externals, the reification of suffering into diseases with good names which are then treated humanely is accompanied by great defensive blindness about internal pain which does indeed lead to neglect of the needs of the dynamic human beings hidden behind the diagnosis with the long name. Szasz's subjective anger at the way human needs and rights are ignored, once the awfulness of madness has been corralled, reified and called a disease, makes us uncomfortable because we know there is some truth in this. But he does not possess the whole truth. He disregards the same three matters as does Laing; first, that whether or not the descrip-tive concepts of psychiatric disease are valid, madness does exist in all its tragedy and insistence; second, that it is cruelly strainful often beyond bearing for anyone to be enmeshed in another's madness; and third, that vigorous personal social and geographic defences against close enmeshment in madness are inevitable.
Laing and Szasz, two original and compassionate reformist workers, seem unable to contemplate the most tragic fact -the awfulness of madness which remains whether it gets this or that long name. Each sees the madman as an innocent victim of the waywardness of others, family and/or psychiatrists, not as truly mad in his own right and not tortured and overwhelmed from within by impossible needs and derivates of primitive loves and hatreds. Yet none who has worked with madness can afford to be too critical of the distresses of either Laing or Szasz nor of their need for defence against the facts. All of us in our clinical work with mad people have found the strains variously intolerable; and desperately have wished for the madness not to exist, or have been indignant that it did, or have sought to lay blame on others for its origins or for its neglectful treatment or for its set-backs.
It is never easy and it is sometimes intolerable to stick to and study even one mad patient, to work under the strain he creates for us and yet to go on for months relating to him and trying to understand his inner world. None of us can treat more than very few at one time. And none of us need be ashamed if we retreat behind long words and proffer pharmacology and reduce contact to a bearable amount. And none of us need apologize if we require our juniors to treat our madmen while we do other things like teaching and research and administration, which are also essential.
All who work with madness are in the same boat, together with Kraepelin, Laing and Szasz; and even our best work is liable to contain defences against the pains of close encounter: isolation, intellectualization, scotomisation, manic humour, reaction formations and so on. The study of these defences is however essential if we are to improve our techniques as scientists and doctors. Searles regards study of the pains of the therapist in close encounter and his inevitable defences against these pains as valuable because they throw light on the patient, on his impossible needs and primitive purposes in his relations with others. Patient study of close and serious involvement will certainly help the better understanding of madness itself but this is a good ambition only for the courageous, talented and well-positioned few. We cannot realistically have the same ambitions for the general psychiatrist with many patients and working in pressured hospital settings. The most we can ask is that he be more sensitive to and more conscious of what goes on under his nose. Then he will become able to study and become consciously aware of and question the social and procedural and institutional defences he and his staff use in the admission examination, conceptualization, management and treatment of his patients and their relatives. Such ongoing study leads to increased awareness and now choice becomes possible about how far defensive stances and manoeuvres are essential, which are best, which are least damaging to honesty and which new ones should be erected. In making conscious decisions about this we need to respect the fact that not only patients need help but staffs and families, over this matter of encounter with madness. The most anyone can ask for is an optimal balance between the needs of the patient, the staffs and the relatives.
Certain procedures clearly contain distancing defences which need our respect; the relatives' request for the patient to be admitted to hospital, the ward staffs' request for the patient to be given ECT or transferred to a locked ward or have his medication increased. And the subjective distress behind such apparently objective requests needs recognition and regular open discussion. Other procedures also need regular open scrutiny if we are to develop our own and our staffs' capacities to care for patients. For instance, it is a common organizational defence against close encounter to fragment the patient into functions, with one staff member caring for his work activities, another for his recreations, another for his bodily health, another for his cleanliness, another for his family relations, another for his clothing, another for his sleep, another for his medication, another for his follow-up. Thus no one individual need care for the whole person or feel responsible for him or for understanding his needs. This fragmentation leads to useful specialist skills and need not be thrown overboard simply because it defends everyone from close, responsible and prolonged encounter with madness. But if routinized it is also liable to lead to such safety for the staff that they become discontented at not having enough encounter, not enough strain nor challenge. It may be better for them to have caseallocation with each caring for all the functions of a few, but we must be clear that this will then require that the strains they now suffer be sought with interest and .discussed regularly.
Many hospital rules and medical routines are essentially defensive against "involvement with patients" and simply protect staff from having to face, understand and feel about each patient's distresses and unique needs and to fashion individual responses to them. Sometimes these routines do less than justice to the staffs' inherent capacity to understand and make subjective flexible decisions for different patients, but this latter possibility also brings the certainty that staff members will then need adequately delegated powers and regular discussion about the dilemmas and subjective feelings aroused in them by different patients. Our fear of the dangers of subjective involvement has often led to the making of safe general rules for staff to follow but the price paid is loss of the potential values of subjectivity and the opportunity of studying and capitalizing on these. On the other hand, use by staff of subjective responses in skilled and scientific ways requires discipline and regular staff studies of subjective feelings and wishes so that these can be used, not impulsively or wildly, but as tools for better understanding of the patients and for the design of insightful staff responses.
Time and the need for tact prevent me from looking further at the ways we doctors, in our need for defences against close encounter with madness, fail to respect our subjectivity and classify and use it for scientific purposes. Hopefully, sometime in the future a new nosology may develop, based on the study of object relations and not on symptoms. I will therefore allow myself some final provocative questions which could then be set in an examination of the future. Some seriously depressed people, hating and reviling themselves, fill their observers with compassion; but others equally depressed irritate their observers. What are these differences due to? What do they tell us about suicidal risk? What do they teach us about the varieties of depression and the psychodynamics of aggressive forces? What different treatments are they liable to evoke (a) from their relatives and (b) from their psychiatrists?
Conclusions
Our psychiatry is lopsided, and our methods of scientifically studying madmen, our observations about them, our approaches to etiology and our treatments are heavily biased by subjective defences -particularly objectivity -against the strains of close enmeshment in madness. No one is immune from these strains, not us, not our staffs, not our institutions, not families, not the public, not the arguing groups of society and not our governments. Our defences are as inevitable as is our pain over madness. The fullest awareness of the scope and varieties of these defences can teach us something of the pains we all have and hide and so give us second choices about how we may best deal with these pains, conscious and deliberate choices rather than unconscious or automatic ones. But more; the fuller study of these pains can allow us better science, and better techniques less automatic or defended, of investigating and examining and treating mad people; and better understanding not only of the disturbed world the madman creates for us and around him but of the nature of his inner world and the primitive object-relations he seeks. After Kraepelin, all who pursue psychiatric truths could thus move onto a new perspective, more strainful and less objective but better anchored in human experience and daily life.
Resume
Notre psychiatrie comporte des prejuges, alors que nos methodes d'etude scientifique des malades mentaux, nos observations les concernant, nos approches etiologiques, de meme que nos traitements sont aussi lourdement affectes par les defenses subjectives (en particulier notre objectivite) contre nos craintes d'etre enserres par la folie. Personne n'est a I'abri de ces tensions; ni nous, ni notre personnel, ni nos institutions, ni nos familles, ni Ie public, ni les groupements de contestation de notre societe, ni nos gouvernements. Nos reactions de defense sont tout aussi inevitables que notre souffrance face ala folie. La pleine connaissance de I'etendue et de la variete de ces defenses peut nous faire comprendre quelque chose des difficultes que nous eprouvons tous et que nous cachons. Ainsi, cela nous donne d'autres alternatives pour mieux passer a travers ces difficultes, des alternatives conscientes et reflechies plutot qu'inconscientes ou automatiques. Mais il y a plus, une etude plus en profondeur de ces difficultes peut nous conduire aune meilleure connaissance scientifique et ades techniques ameliorees moins automatiques ou defensives pour etudier, examiner et traiter les malades mentaux. Elle amene aussi aune comprehension meilleure non seulement du monde trouble cree par le malade mental pour nous et autour de lui, mais aussi a celIe de la nature de son monde interieur et de sa recherche primitive d'une relation d' objet. A la suite de Kraepelin, tous ceux qui recherchent les verites psychiatriques pourraient voir des champs nouveaux s'ouvrir, ceux-ci plus ardus et moins objectifs, mais prenant leurs racines dans l' experience humaine et la vie quotidienne.
